We examine a manufacturer's pricing strategies in a dual-channel supply chain, in which the manufacturer is a Stackelberg leader and the retailer is a follower. We show the conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer both prefer a dual-channel supply chain. We examine the coordination schemes for a dual-channel supply chain and find that a manufacturer's contract with a wholesale price and a price for the direct channel can coordinate the dual-channel supply channel, benefiting the retailer but not the manufacturer. We illustrate how such a contract with a complementary agreement, such as a two-part tariff or a profit-sharing agreement, can coordinate the dual-channel supply chain and enable both the manufacturer and the retailer to be a win-win. © 2011 Elsevier Ltd.
CITATION STYLE
Chen, J., Zhang, H., & Sun, Y. (2012). Implementing coordination contracts in a manufacturer Stackelberg dual-channel supply chain. Omega, 40(5), 571–583. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2011.11.005
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