In (Schupbach 2008), I put forward a "possibility result" for Bayesian Coherentism, showing that there exist plausible sets of ceteris paribus conditions that imply that coherence is truth-conducive. Against this result, Schubert (2012) argues that the specific ceteris paribus conditions I consider are "jointly inconsistent". In this article, I prove to the contrary that these conditions can consistently be enforced while allowing degrees of coherence to vary. Next, I consider a related criticism, inspired by Olsson's (2005) constraints on ceteris paribus conditions. This leads to a general discussion of the principle(s) that should guide one in choosing appropriately stringent ceteris paribus conditions.
CITATION STYLE
Schupbach, J. N. (2015). The possibility of Coherentism and the stringency of ceteris paribus conditions. In Theoria (Spain) (Vol. 30, pp. 43–52). Universidad del Pais Vasco. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.11725
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