The role of incentives and communication in strategic alliances: An experimental investigation

  • Agarwal R
  • Croson R
  • Mahoney J
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This paper experimentally examines the determinants of the deviation between potential and realized value creation in strategic alliances. To better understand how decision making in alliances may influence success, we use an experimental design that juxtaposes two important factors that affect alliance members’ decisions: economic incentives and communication. The evidence from our experiment sheds light on the relative impact of each, and more importantly, how both factors interact to explain successful outcomes.

Author-supplied keywords

  • Communication
  • Economic incentives
  • Experiments
  • Game theory
  • Social dilemma
  • Strategic alliances

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  • Rajshree Agarwal

  • Rachel Croson

  • Joseph T. Mahoney

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