This article examines how norms and intrinsic forms of motivation can inform agency-theory assumptions about how to manage bureaucratic misbehavior. In particular, the potential for public service motivation to mediate self-interested moral hazard is examined. Recent decades have seen the public sector move toward a market model, which has increased the opportunities for moral hazard by tying high-powered incentives to incomplete contracts. At the same time, the market model may crowd out intrinsic values that provide the best protection against exploitation of those situations. © 2010 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
CITATION STYLE
Moynihan, D. P. (2010). A workforce of cynics? The effects of contemporary reforms on public service motivation. International Public Management Journal, 13(1), 24–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/10967490903547167
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