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La Distincion Platonica Entre Episteme Y Doxa Alethes A La Luz Del Tratamiento Del Error.

by Graciela e Marcos De Pinotti
Rev Filosof (argentina) ()


The unsuccessful discussion of theatetus's false judgment is usually considered a digression with no connection at all with plato's attack to the second definition of knowledge. This paper argues that it is rather a reductio of it. 188a-c shows that the episteme–doxa alethes identification is self-contradictory as it requires a previous distinction between what truth and falsity are. Nevertheless, falsehood cannot be explained. The argument brings out interesting consequences concerning platonic conception of error.

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