Moral Psychology as Accountability

Abstract

When moral psychology exploded a decade ago with groundbreaking research, there was considerable excitement about the potential fruits of collaboration between moral philosophers and moral psychologists. However, this enthusiasm soon gave way to controversy about whether either field was, or even could be, relevant to the other. After all, it seems at first glance that the primary question researched by mord psychologists-how people form judgments about what is morally right and wrong-is independent from the parallel question investigated by moral philosophers-what is in fact morally right and wrong, and why. Once we transcend the narrow bounds of quandary ethics and "trolleyolog" however, a broader look at the fields of moral psychology and moral philosophy reveals several common interests. Three areas of common interest-moral motivation, the moral emotions, and the distinctiveness of morality-present an under-appreciated opportunity for fruitful collaboration between moral philosophers and moral psychologists. As a step in this direction, this chapter argues that a recent philosophical proposal regarding the nature of morality provides significant insights into moral psychology. The philosophical framework we present makes substantive psychological predictions which are well confirmed by the empirical literature. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)