According to G.E.M. Anscombe, an agent's knowledge of his own intentional actions differs from his knowledge of his unintended behaviors as well as the knowledge others can have of what he intentionally does, in being known "without observation". I begin by posing a problem for any conception of this theory according to which non-observational knowledge must be independent of sense perception, and criticize several recent attempts to get around the problem. Having done this, I develop an alternative account of non-observational knowledge according to which it consists in the particular causal role of an agent's self-awareness in bringing his intentional actions about. © 2011 Taylor & Francis.
CITATION STYLE
Schwenkler, J. (2011, June). Perception and practical knowledge. Philosophical Explorations. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2011.569749
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.