Communication Theory ISSN 1050-3293
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Communication as a Dynamical
Self-Sustaining System: The Importance
of Time-Scales and Nested Context
Ju¨rgen Streeck1 & J. Scott Jordan2
1 Department of Communication Studies, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78712, U.S.A.
2 Department of Psychology, Illinois State University, Normal, IL 61790-4120, U.S.A.
This article examines the utility of modeling communication as dynamic nesting of self-
sustaining embodied contexts functioning at multiple time-scales simultaneously. We begin
with van Orden and Holden’s (2002) assertion that an individual’s cognitive work emerges
in generative, dynamic fashion out of the ongoing synergistic interaction between processes
taking place at multiple time-scales. We apply this notion to communication via Lemke’s
(2000) application of heterochronic interactions to the social realm, and utilize Jordan and
Ghin’s (2006) conceptualization of the ‘‘body’’ as a self-sustaining embodiment of contexts
playing themselves out at different, nested time-scales. We examine multiple interpersonal
interactions involving the owner of an autoshop, and focus on how embodiments such as
foot movements constrain and contextualize multiple time-scales of context simultaneously.
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2885.2009.01351.x
Within the field of communication studies, many researchers (Clark, 1996; Duncan,
2005; Goodwin, 2006; Streeck, 2001) investigate the body and the means by which
it is utilized as a communicative medium. Now, in the field of cognitive science,
researchers are increasingly emphasizing the role the body plays in cognition (Clark,
1997, 2001; Juarrero, 1999;Myin&O’Regan, 2002;O’Regan&No¨e, 2001; VanGelder,
1998; Van Orden & Holden, 2002). For example, there is a growing acceptance of
the idea (Wilson, 2002) that certain higher-level cognitive abilities are rooted in
lower-level sensory-motor skills. This claim is based on recent findings indicating
that the concepts underlying language seem to be coded in the brain in terms of visual
representations and/or action-perception contingencies (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg,
1997; Zwaan, 1999) rather than propositional codes.
This move toward grounding cognition in body dynamics versus internal symbol
processing is known as embodied cognition. And given its emphasis on accounting for
cognition in terms of time and the synergistic, interdependent nature of processes
Corresponding author: Ju¨rgen Streeck; e-mail: jstreeck@mail.utexas.edu
Communication Theory 19 (2009) 445–464 © 2009 International Communication Association 445

Communication as a Dynamical Self-Sustaining System J. Streeck & J.S. Jordan
that take place at different time-scales (i.e., brains, bodies, and world), the purpose of
the present article is to present a recently developed take on embodied cognition (i.e.,
wild systems theory—WST; Jordan in press, 2008; Jordan & Ghin, 2006, 2007) that
we believe may provide a conceptual framework that affords a seamless integration
of research that emphasizes the role the body plays in cognition and communication.
To make this case, we first examine the notions of embodiment and nested
time-scales of interaction and how they are related to embodied cognition. We then
presentWST and clarify howwe believe it affords a scale-up from themultiscale inter-
actions that constitute individual cognitive systems to the multiagent interactions
that constitute communicative systems. Finally, we demonstrate the framework’s
integrative power via a conversational analysis of a particular communicative inter-
action. Ultimately, our goal is to present a framework that we believe provides a
unique perspective on cognition and communication that potentially overcomes
conceptual dualities such as physical–mental and mind–body, which have impeded
both our ability to ground meaning as well as to integrate interdisciplinary research
in cognition and communication.
Nested time-scales in cognition and communication
Traditional computational approaches model cognition in terms of the computer
metaphor. They therefore treat the work of cognition as the construction and
manipulation of mental representations that are assumed to exist at a fairly isolated
level in one’s structural hierarchy (i.e., at a particular level of brain activity such
as action potentials or neural-network coordinations) and are assumed to serve as
mediating causes of behavior.
As a counter to computationalism, proponents of the embodied cognition
position focus more on real-time interaction and the interdependence of processes
taking place at different, yet nested, time-scales (i.e., brain, body, and world) versus
isolated mental representations. Van Orden and Holden (2002), for example, argue
these nested time-scales (i.e., brain, body, and world) interact in a continuously
coupled, synergistic fashion. According to this view, mental work cannot be localized
at an isolated level because of the extreme degree of interaction and interdependence
between levels. Instead, mental work emerges in a generative fashion, over time, out
of the continuous interactive couplings among processes that function at different
time-scales (e.g., neurons, neural assemblies, brains, bodies, and the world). Given
this framework’s ability to overcome certain theoretical problems faced by the more
traditional framework (Clark, 1997, 2001; Thelen, Scho¨ner, Scheier, & Smith, 2001;
van Gelder, 1998), many cognitive scientists now use it as an account of phenomena
such as variability and stability in neural activity (Ito, Nikolaev, & van Leeuwen,
2005), trial-to-trial variability in reaction-time data (Cooney, 1998; Gilden, 2001),
and visual awareness (Hurley, 1998; Noe, 2004).
At the social level, Lemke (2000) recently proposed the notion of nested time-
scales as a model for the social sciences in general, and as an account of the role
446 Communication Theory 19 (2009) 445–464 © 2009 International Communication Association