Abstract
This chapter surveys various paradoxes of confirmation and inductive reasoning: Hempel’s paradox of the ravens, Goodman’s new riddle of induction and the tacking by conjunction paradox. It is shown how these paradoxes affect standard accounts of confirmation in science, such as confirmation by positive instances, hypothetico-deductive confirmation and Bayesian confirmation, i.e., increase in subjective probability of the hypothesis. The chapter explains how the various accounts of confirmation can address these challenges.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Sprenger, J. (2023). THE PARADOXES OF CONFIRMATION. In The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence (pp. 113–123). Taylor and Francis. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315672687-12
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