Abstract
Set within the context of cryptographic engineering, timing attacks are a class of side-channel attack: if the execution latency of some target operation depends on security-critical data, this may allow an attacker to leverage passive execution latency measurements in any attempt to recover said data. Timing attacks have a rich history, and, in part because variation in execution latency can arise from a wide range of sources, remain surprisingly stubborn. Although a known problem, they remain far from a solved problem as evidenced by related instances continuing to appear more than 20 years since initial publications on the topic. The aim of this chapter is to offer an introduction to that topic, covering both a set of foundational concepts from a more theoretical perspective and a set of example attacks and their mitigation (via countermeasures) from a more applied perspective.
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CITATION STYLE
Page, D. (2025). Timing Attacks. In Embedded Cryptography 1 (pp. 1–29). wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781394351879.ch1
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