Abstract
In this article, we provide the epistemicentrenchment characterization of the weak version of Parikh's relevance-sensitive axiom for belief revision - known as axiom (P) - for the general case of incomplete theories. Loosely speaking, axiom (P) states that, if a belief set K can be divided into two disjoint compartments, and the new information φ relates only to the first compartment, then the second compartment should not be affected by the revision of K by φ. The above-mentioned characterization, essentially, constitutes additional constraints on epistemicentrenchment preorders, that induce AGM revision functions, satisfying the weak version of Parikh's axiom (P).
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CITATION STYLE
Aravanis, T., Peppas, P., & Williams, M. A. (2017). Epistemic-entrenchment characterization of Parikh’s axiom. In IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (Vol. 0, pp. 772–778). International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/107
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