Abstract
This paper offers a new interpretation and defence of a familiar feminist criticism of pornography, namely that some pornography objectifies not just the women who feature in it, but women more generally. I give this claim a distinctive twist, arguing that pornography epistemically objectifies women. Drawing parallels to work on testimonial injustice by Miranda Fricker and others, I argue that women are often objectified in pornography by being represented as epistemically fungible: as interchangeable with others belonging to the same group when it comes to what one can learn from them on some topic. Focusing on pornographic films, my proposal is that some films depict the women seen performing in them as fungible with a much wider group in respect of what one can learn about their sexual preferences; this wider group of women is thereby falsely represented as relatively homogenous, rather than as individuals.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
McGlynn, A. (2025). Epistemic objectification in pornography. The Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaf032
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