Corporate Donations to Electoral Campaigns: A Case Study of White-Collar Crime

Abstract

Mackenzie and Green (2008) and McBarnet (2006) have argued that it is possible for white-collar crimes to emerge from actions that are cloaked in legality. In this article I study this paradox, focusing on the case of corporate donations to electoral campaigns. In particular, I will present an intra-national study on corporate funding of elections in Colombia. The case examines the electoral donations from palm oil growers' firms to the 2002 and 2006 presidential campaigns of Álvaro Uribe. It illustrates how legal donations delivered by corporations were reciprocated by incumbents through favourable legislation and policy outcomes. Although donors were not prosecuted for giving electoral donations, since it is a legal practice, administrative and judicial authorities have demonstrated that the donors communicated with incumbents with the intention to commit fraud.