Some Assembly Required: Explaining Variations in Legislative Oversight over the Armed Forces

Abstract

Legislatures vary widely in how they affect democratic civil-military relations. In some countries, legislative oversight plays a critical role in guiding their defense establishment. In others, legislators are largely ignorant and happily so. In this article, we explain the sources of these variations in fifteen democratic states. After discussing the importance of the legislature's role in democratic civil-military relations, we clarify what we mean by oversight. We argue that variations in oversight are explained by the number and scope of legislative committees charged with military oversight and party politics within those committees. After reviewing alternative explanations, we present oversight patterns in fifteen democratic countries across the world. We then briefly examine Germany's Bundestag and Japan's Diet, as the comparison of these cases challenges most existing explanations of legislative oversight and serve as hard cases for our argument. We conclude with implications of legislative oversight for broader debates about civilian control of the military.