Elektorale Koordination, legislative Kohäsion und der Aufstieg der modernen Massenpartei: Die Grenzen des Mehrheitswahlrechts im Deutschen Kaiserreich, 1890-1918

Abstract

Explanations of the switch from majoritarian (MR) to proportional representation (PR) at the beginning of the 20th century focus on parties' expected gains of seats. But these gains had actually been achieved even under MR, via local-level electoral alliances. Moreover, the underlying assumption of major parties of the time as unitary actors appears inaccurate. Rather, PR proved attractive for leaders of established parties whose struggle for control over backbencher behavior was exacerbated by increasing alliance diversity and the rise of modern mass parties. This rise, incarnated in the socialist parties, thus threatened legislative, not electoral majorities of established parties. Using encompassing datasets on alliances and parliamentary voting behavior for Germany in the period 1890-1918, we show this argument to hold empirically.