Si-Backside Protection Circuits against Physical Security Attacks on Flip-Chip Devices

30Citations
Citations of this article
8Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

This article is free to access.

Abstract

This article presents a cryptographic key protection technique from physical security attacks through Si-backside of IC chip. Flip-chip packaging leads to a serious security hole that allows emerging backside physical security attacks. The proposed backside buried metal (BBM) structure forming a meander wire pattern on the Si-backside detects unexpected disconnection of the meander and warns the malicious attempts to expose a vulnerable Si substrate. Moreover, the BBM meander also shields key information of cryptographic circuit from both passive side-channel attacks and active laser fault injection as well. Unlike other conventional laminate-based protection, this backside monolithic approach does not require frontside wiring resources or additional packaging layers, resulting in only 0.0025% size-overhead. The BBM meander was formed on the backside of a 0.13-\mu \text{m} CMOS cryptographic chip by wafer-level via-last BBM processing.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Miki, T., Nagata, M., Sonoda, H., Miura, N., Okidono, T., Araga, Y., … Kikuchi, K. (2020). Si-Backside Protection Circuits against Physical Security Attacks on Flip-Chip Devices. IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits, 55(10), 2747–2755. https://doi.org/10.1109/JSSC.2020.3005779

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free