Protests, Internet shutdowns, and disinformation in a transitioning state

Abstract

Internet shutdowns authorized by the state are becoming a recurring case in countries under military or authoritarian rule, such as Sudan. This article examines how the military in Sudan shut down the Internet to cover up the June 3 massacre. The shutdown made it difficult for the protestors and civilians to share and document the human rights violations committed by the state from June 3 to July 9, 2019. We also demonstrate how the Internet shutdowns were instrumental in circulating state-sponsored disinformation campaigns delegitimizing the protests. The article expands on existing literature to explain how information vacuums are conducive to the spread of disinformation and the weakening of on-ground protest movements. Despite the crippling effects of the Internet shutdown in Khartoum, our analysis illustrates how protestors challenged designed technical and physical workarounds to circumvent the shutdown.