Compliance to “Unpleasant” actions of crisis management: some remarks from a management control perspective

Abstract

In managing the Covid-16 pandemic, policy makers took actions which require the cooperation of individual citizens to succeed while the actions partially come at remarkable costs for individuals. The brief paper employs a thought experiment to identify factors which affect individuals’ propensity to cooperate in the public goods game. These factors reasonably comprise, for example, risk perception and attitude towards risk, embeddedness in a social network or the desire for social approval and may differ remarkably among the individuals of a collective. The paper adopts a management control perspective which appears to be particularly helpful to identify how to implement policy makers’ actions with respect to the diverse individuals in a collective. In order to predict the overall outcome of “unpleasant” actions, an approach is required which allows to capture the heterogeneity of individuals within a collective which makes agent-based modelling a promising candidate.