On divergence of “morality” and “ethics”

Abstract

The divergence of Russian concepts “moral'” and “nravstvennost'” (in German “Sittlichkeit”, in English “ethics”/“ethical life”, in French “éthique”) in various versions is quite common in literature and can be taken as a doubtless discursive fact. Usually such divergence is a result of substantialization of some functional and normative features of morality/ethics distin-guished by philosophy. Internal heterogeneity is inherent in morality/ethics both at functional and normative levels. A special analysis of various attempts to discriminate “morality” and “ethics” is needed to clarify the theoretical and methodological prerequisites of such diver-gence, its principal expediency, probable rationale and possible ‘gaps’. For authors outside of philosophy, especially moral philosophy, the separation of “morality” and “ethics” often turns out to be the last stage in their contemplation of morality-ethics with an evident disregard of conceptual apparatus developed in moral philosophy to conceptualize the phenomenon of morality/ethics in its internal heterogeneity and polyvalence. It would be an oversimplifica-tion to think that attempts to diverge morality and ethics have been always a result of theoretical misunderstandings. On the contrary, the divergence may be motivated by convincing theoretical reasons and authors who apply such approach commonly consider it as a fruitful way to enhance our understanding of normative culture and normative experience. The article attempts to analyze in the first approximation some projects in divergence of morality and ethics. The author of the article does not believe that the distinction of morality and ethics is truly sufficient, but does not exclude that such attempts being consistently implemented could have some positive theoretical effects, and should be evaluated in each individual case.