Abstract
This article encourages operational thinkers to apply the philosophies of Carl von Clausewitz, Thucydides, and Mao Zedong when integrating technology into future war strategy to remember that humans not only begin wars but also end them. T he contemporary literature on future war remains too focused on the tactical level. General John R. Allen and Amir Husain's recent article in Proceedings entitled "On Hyperwar" illustrates this fixation. Similar to other writings, Allen and Hussain argue victory, in future war, will be predicated upon integrating increasing levels of artificial intelligence and bypassing human decision-makers. 1 Such an operational concept claims wars will become more efficient, synchronized, and quick to solve the limitations of human endurance and the natural propensity for indecision in the face of uncertainty. Seeking game-changing capabilities to neutralize potential US adversaries is clearly important; however, writers of this literature often overlook operational applications of future capabilities. Thus, impacts are viewed in isolation. 2 Undeniably, senior leaders have a practical grasp of the nature of war due to the breadth and depth of their experience. Military and civilian leaders can, however, interpret tech-centric solutions as indications that overcoming near-peer adversaries simply requires technological superiority. Consequently, we run the risk of embracing hardware that conflicts with the nature of war, and we avoid a serious discussion of how a thinking enemy may respond and adjust. The key failure of most discussions on future systems stems from the claim that these capabilities can somehow override the factors of fog, friction, and uncertainty-or even change human nature. Ultimately, this assumption obscures the fact that war is the use of violence to impose one's will on the enemy. This article argues that separating the nature of war from the character of warfare makes understanding the integration of innovative technologies and their roles in future wars easier.
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CITATION STYLE
Euhus, B. T. (2018). A Clausewitzian Response to “Hyperwarfare.” The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, 48(3). https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.2767
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