Exploring Simulation Methods to Counter Cyber-Attacks on the Steering Systems of the Maritime Autonomous Surface Ship (MASS)

Abstract

This paper presents a simulation-based investigation into control strategies for mitigating the consequences of cyber-assault on the steering systems of the Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS). The study focuses on two simulation experiments conducted within the Simulink/MATLAB environment, utilizing the catamaran “Nymo” MASS mathematical model to represent vessel dynamics. Cyber-attacks are modeled as external disturbances affecting the rudder control signal, emulating realistic interference scenarios. To assess control resilience, two configurations are compared during a representative turning maneuver to a specified heading: (1) a Proportional–Integral–Derivative (PID) regulator augmented with a Least Mean Squares (LMS) adaptive filter, and (2) a Nonlinear Autoregressive Moving Average with Exogenous Input (NARMA-L2) neural network regulator. The PID and LMS configurations aim to enhance the disturbance rejection capabilities of the classical controller through adaptive filtering, while the NARMA-L2 approach represents a data-driven, nonlinear control alternative. Simulation results indicate that although the PID and LMS setups demonstrate improved performance over standalone PID in the presence of cyber-induced disturbances, the NARMA-L2 controller exhibits superior adaptability, accuracy, and robustness under adversarial conditions. These findings suggest that neural network-based control offers a promising pathway for developing cyber-resilient steering systems in autonomous maritime vessels.