Reforming Customs by measuring performance: A Cameroon case study

Abstract

Many Customs administrations have suffered from corruption and struggled to identify options for ameliorating this malady. In seeking to reduce corruption, while simultaneously strengthening performance (such as raising revenue collection and enhancing trade facilitation), policymakers should conduct experiments that can assist in identifying constructive policies. Such an experiment has been tested for Cameroon Customs, with some preliminarily positive results. In 2007, Cameroon launched a reform of its Customs administration, which included the installation of ASYCUDA (an automated Customs clearance system). In February 2010, as a continuation of the reform, Cameroon Customs introduced a system of performance contracts signed between the Director General and a number of front-line officers in the port of Douala. The core of the performance contracts is an agreement that the practices of the customs officers will be recorded and reported to the Director General. After four months of their implementation, initial results are encouraging (including lower corruption, higher revenue collection, and shorter clearance times) and may point to the birth of a new professional culture. This paper focuses on the experience and results so far of the performance contracts aspect of the reform, and suggests that replication may be beneficial for other Customs administrations.