As migrações partidárias e a correlação de forças na câmara dos deputados (1995-2006)

Abstract

Academic literature has emphasized the fact that high rates of political party migration within the House of Representatives would undermine the Brazilian political party system and provoke political instability by making coalitions within parliament fragile. The research question behind this article involves analysis of the relationship between party migration and the correlation of forces within the House of Representatives. In order to move our research agenda forward, we look at the daily variation of party migrations, measuring this indirectly by looking at the variation of party benches, between 1995 and 2006, comparing them to the party composition of executive boards and presidencies of the Commissions on the Constitution and Justice and on Finances and Taxation.. Our major finding is that high rates of political party migration have an impact on the smaller party benches, but do not affect the sizes of the four larges benches to a degree that could alter the correlation of forces within the House of Representatives. Such a discovery runs counter to the relationship that has been put forth by the critics of party migration within Brazil, regarding high rates of migration and political instability within the House of Representatives.