Corporate governance of pension plans: The U.K. evidence

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Abstract

For this study of the governance of defined-benefit pension plans in the United Kingdom, the governance measure was equal to the proportion of trustees of the pension plan in 2002 who were also executive directors of the sponsoring company. The findings indicate that pension plans of indebted companies with a higher proportion of insider than independent trustees invest a higher proportion of pension plan assets in equities and that the sponsors contribute less to the plan and have a larger dividend payout ratio. This evidence supports the agency view that insider trustees act in the interests of shareholders of the sponsor, not necessarily in the interests of pension plan members. © 2007, CFA Institute.

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Cocco, J. F., & Volpin, P. F. (2007). Corporate governance of pension plans: The U.K. evidence. Financial Analysts Journal, 63(1), 70–83. https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v63.n1.4409

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