Political Decay in Somalia: From Personal Rule to Warlordism

Abstract

IR: After Barre's regime fell in 1991, lawlessness took over, which has resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis. The personal rule of the Barre regime, which later evolved into sultanism (i.e. when the ruler uses abritrary violence), helps explain the current (1992) crisis. Barre's patrimonial behavior meant that some people had access to power (so they had a personal interest in the continuation of the regime), while others did not. The circle of power eventually narrowed down to Barre's family. The looting that takes place right now (1992), is part of Barre's legacy (as robbery was a way of life even before his downfall, the country was bankrupt, and some of the looters were part of Barre's military units). The decay of the state is also a result of Barre's patrimonialism and started long before his regime fell. From 1988 onwards, national armed forces used their power to loot and kill. Many later joined clan militias and armed gangs. Barre used clanism as a political resource. In order to keep their loyalty, he gave certain clan members important positions, while encouraging clan rivalry. In this way, Barre "repoliticized lineage competition". Opposition to Barre had always been weak, because it was largely clan-based (which limited appeal to other groups). Also, none of the opposition groups had a clear view how to rebuild the country after regime change. They seem to have been motivated only "by the struggle of supremacy and the sharing of the spoils". Compagnon concludes that warlords are likely to consolidate their power, helped by humanitarian intervention. None of the warlords will want to give up power, so that the threat of war remains.