The intersectional case of poverty in discrimination law

Abstract

In this article I aim to identify the nature of poverty discrimination, its judicial treatment and possible redressal within the discourse of discrimination law. The article delineates a key 'intersectional' feature of poverty as one which intersects with (i) multiple disadvantages of redistribution (joblessness, homelessness, malnutrition, illiteracy), recognition (stereotypes, stigma, humiliation), participation (social and political exclusion) and transformation (structural domination); as well as (ii) multiple grounds and status-identities (like race, colour, religion, sex, gender, sexual orientation, disability, age and so on). This complex and cross-cutting intersectional nature of poverty can be recognised in discrimination law not only by reading in poverty as a ground, but also by opening up ways of thinking about poverty as central to our conceptual understanding of equality and nondiscrimination per se. Treating poverty as a matter of discriminatory context or as a matter of substantive equality are two such worthwhile strategies to take a cue from.