CEO MONITORING AND ACCOUNTING RECORD MANIPULATION: EVIDENCE FROM SLOVAK AGRICULTURE COMPANIES

7Citations
Citations of this article
21Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

Abstract

Many authors focus on detecting accounting record manipulation using various models and investigating the reasons of accounting falsification and alteration. In general, the tax base is changed because its optimization benefits the business. Various research studies show that the CEO is the one who commences the process of updating accounting data. As a result, we'd like to show the gender of persons that initiate manipulation the most frequently. By recognizing inventive accounting, Beneish's methodology is utilized to identify organizations that have cheated. As a result, organizations are categorized as having a female, male, or mixed management team. Based on the Beneish model, statistical approaches (such as contingency tables and establishing the link between variables), and correspondence analysis, we established that gender influences how a company's accounting is managed: if a woman is a director, the company is regarded non-manipulative. In contrast, if a male keeps control of the corporation, the company has a strong incentive to falsify its financial reports.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Kliestik, T., Blazek, R., & Belas, J. (2022). CEO MONITORING AND ACCOUNTING RECORD MANIPULATION: EVIDENCE FROM SLOVAK AGRICULTURE COMPANIES. Economics and Sociology, 15(4), 204–218. https://doi.org/10.14254/2071-789X.2022/15-4/10

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free