Side-channel timing attack of RSA on a GPU

Abstract

To increase computation throughput, general purpose Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) have been leveraged to accelerate computationally intensive workloads. GPUs have been used as cryptographic engines, improving encryption/decryption throughput and leveraging the GPU's Single Instruction Multiple Thread (SIMT) model. RSA is a widely used public-key cipher and has been ported onto GPUs for signing and decrypting large files. Although performance has been significantly improved, the security of RSA on GPUs is vulnerable to side-channel timing attacks and is an exposure overlooked in previous studies. GPUs tend to be naturally resilient to side-channel attacks, given that they execute a large number of concurrent threads, performing many RSA operations on different data in parallel. Given the degree of parallel execution on a GPU, there will be a significant amount of noise introduced into the timing channel given the thousands of concurrent threads executing concurrently. In this work, we build a timing model to capture the parallel characteristics of an RSA public-key cipher implemented on a GPU. We consider optimizations that include using Montgomery multiplication and slidingwindow exponentiation to implement cryptographic operations. Our timing model considers the challenges of parallel execution, complications that do not occur in single-Threaded computing platforms. Based on our timing model, we launch successful timing attacks on RSA running on a GPU, extracting the private key of RSA. We also present an effective error detection and correction mechanism. Our results demonstrate that GPU acceleration of RSA is vulnerable to side-channel timing attacks. We propose several countermeasures to defend against this class of attacks.