Research on the Evolutionary Game Path of Three Parties in Technology Finance from the Perspective of Project Risk

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Abstract

The financing dilemma faced by technology enterprises has become an important obstacle to the further development of technology finance. This paper constructs the evolutionary game model of government, financial institutions and enterprises, introduces the project risk factor, and studies the cooperative path mechanism of multi-subjects in technology finance by combining stability analysis and SD simulation. The results show that: from the perspective of project risk, government subsidies to financial institutions are significantly better than subsidies to enterprises, and project risk plays a decisive role in tripartite cooperation. In addition to giving full play to the government's support to financial institutions, the project risks should be reasonably evaluated to minimize the information asymmetry between financial institutions and enterprises, so as to effectively solve the financing problems of technology enterprises.

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Yan, G., Li, W., & Guo, T. (2022). Research on the Evolutionary Game Path of Three Parties in Technology Finance from the Perspective of Project Risk. In Advances in Transdisciplinary Engineering (Vol. 20, pp. 1005–1020). IOS Press BV. https://doi.org/10.3233/ATDE220105

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