Introduction

Abstract

Many would agree with Talal Asad that ‘the terms “public” and “private” form a basic pair of categories in modem liberal society. It is central to the law, and cmcial to the ways in which our liberties are protected. Our approval of other societies depends on the measure to which they reflect the categories as we do’ (2003, p. 683). However, the content of these notions and their distinction has never been so controversial as in our days. First, the distinction between public and private has been criticized from many quarters as ideologically tainted, in the sense that ‘the classic liberal public/private dichotomy hides lots of publics and tries to keep lots of political or public issues (e.g. structural power-asymmetries) “private”, i.e. off the public/political agenda’ (Bader, 2008). Second, the same distinction has been criticized as ‘culture-specific’. Hanne Petersen believes that the private/public dichotomy is connected to the monotheistic way to conceive religion, ‘inherited by secular state organizations and regulations. The “Atlantic-European” inspired secular normative culture introduces a division in public and private spheres, which continues a tradition of gender division and class privilege’ (2012, p. 121). Others go further and identify a direct link between the public/private divide and Christianity (in particular Protestant Christianity), where religion is seen as something that primarily affects the spiritual (versus the material) side of human existence, the forum internum as opposed to the forum externum: according to Judith Butler ‘we could not have the distinction between public and private were it not for the Protestant injunction to privatize religion’ (2011, p. 71). In all these cases it is highlighted that the private/public distinction is culturally biased and far from being universal. Finally, others underline that it is also a crude and imprecise distinction: a sharp line neatly dividing these two dimensions of human life cannot be drawn and, whatever definition of public and private is adopted, it is impossible to remove a large grey area in which public and private overlap and mingle (see Henaff and Strong, 2001, p. 23). These criticisms cannot be overlooked but, on the other hand, the public/ private distinction is deeply ingrained in our way of understanding the social fabric and plays a positive role in building and maintaining a democratic society. ‘The public/private split is normatively valuable’ - Parkinson writes - because ‘it creates normative room for citizens to exercise individual autonomy, and a public sphere in which conflicts between the results of those autonomous decisions can be resolved, or at least discussed’ (2009, p. 75): a world where private is public and vice versa would probably be a totalitarian or a theocratic world. As underlined by Gaudreault-DesBiens and Karazivan, ‘the division between the public and private spheres still matters today [...] whether we like it or not, this divide continues to inspire the state’s regulatory endeavours, as well as the behaviour of many citizens’ (2012, p. 94). For these reasons, a careful and prudent use of these two categories can still provide useful hints to reflect on the place to be assigned to religion and on the role it can play in either area.