The "Values" Discussion Group at the University of Toronto, February - May 1949

Abstract

On June 18, 1948, the trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) approved an appropriation of $25,000 "for use by the officers for the Social Sciences in the development of opportunities in the general area of Moral Issues in the Economic Order." This funding was to "enable the officers to invite memoranda from thoughtful students and men of affairs who, it is believed, may have significant ideas to contribute to the Foundation as to directions in which work in this area [the field of morals and ethics] may be most profitably prosecuted" (RF, RAC, 1949). One of the "thoughtful students" who was evidently invited to submit a memorandum was Harold Adams Innis, professor of political economy at the University of Toronto, he had established himself as the Rockefeller Foundation's most trusted advisor on matters pertaining to the social sciences in Canada.(1) Innis duly submitted a letter to his friend Joseph Willits (director of the RF Social Sciences Division), in which he requested support for "a small discussion group which has been set up in response to a suggestion from [Pendleton] Herring [president of the American Social Science Research Council] of an interest in the problem of value. He has intimated that you are expecting a request from me and I now write to say that we think $200 will be sufficient to cover the expenses of a rapporteur. If this amount seems too trivial for you to handle, I might be able to find other sources but I am following Herring's instructions" (Innis, 1949). Innis' request, not surprisingly, was approved, with the stipulation that the officers in the social sciences would be "provided with a report on ethical values in the economic order" that presumably would summarize the group's deliberations (RF, RAC, 1949). "Mr. Clark dealt with an empirical problem -- What is wrong with the American Value System?(15) He defined values as objectives toward which people strive. The problem he described as failure to agree on objectives. He analyzed some 'soft spots' in the value structure in American society" (VDG, February 15, 1949, p. 1). The "soft spots" included the weakening of a value system in a frontier society, the passing of the rural community involving "the divorce of city from country," the lack of an aristocratic tradition, "the irresponsibility of religious institutions, the failure of higher education,... the break-down of the family system in America," and "the irresponsibility of mass communication" (p. 1). Clark's statement led to a wide-ranging discussion about the implications of the points that he had raised, including the "efficiency in modern means of communication as a factor in the inter-action of value systems" (p. 3). Ginsberg began his presentation with an overview of Herbert Spencer's theory of evolution (Spencer, 1897-1906). He argued that Spencer's account was limited because it mistakenly derived an ethical theory from a general theory of evolution. In doing so, he noted T. H. Huxley's claim that "one can't move from the evolution of ethics to ethics of evolution. Ethical theory can't be deduced from the facts of evolution. The latter fail to supply us with criteria" (p. 3). Ginsberg went on to examine the argument of Julian Huxley for an ethics of evolution, grounded in the view that in human societies evolution is carried on by " 'social heritage' " and "through cooperation, the pooling of resources and organization." It thus becomes possible to " 'inject' into the evolutionary process such qualities as faith, courage, love of truth, goodness--in a word--moral purpose" (p. 3). According to Ginsberg, Julian Huxley failed to adequately address the issues originally raised by his grandfather: "[he] has not removed the antithesis between the cosmic process and ethical process nor has he established that one can move from the evolution of ethics to an ethics of evolution." (p. 4). Ginsberg's statement led to a discussion about such issues as "the relationship between freedom and efficiency in such an authoritarian society as the Nazi one," as well as "the relation between freedom, coercion, and survival" overall (p. 5). The discussion then moved toward a more general register, addressing issues such as how moral judgments could be validated and the role of values in social investigation. The session concluded with some critical commentary about functionalist theory, which was held to be lacking in precision and to wrongly assume that harmony is a central characteristic of social phenomena.