Abstract
This paper proposes an incentive scheme based on a public–private partnership (PPP) to encourage low-carbon travel behavior by inducing the mode choice shift from private cars to public transit. The scheme involves three key entities: travelers, the government, and the private sector. Travelers can choose between private cars and public transit, producing different emissions. As the leader, the government aims to reduce total emission to a certain level with limited budgets. The private sector, as an intermediary, invests subsidies in low-carbon rewards to attract green travelers and benefits from a larger user pool. A two-layer multi-objective optimization model is proposed, which includes travel time, monetary cost, and emission. The objective of the upper level is to maximize the utilities of the private sector and minimize social costs to the government. The lower layer is the user equilibrium of the travelers. The numerical results obtained through heuristic algorithms demonstrate that the proposed scheme can achieve a triple-win situation, where all stakeholders benefit. Moreover, sensitivity analysis finds that prioritizing pollution control strategies will be beneficial to the government only if the unit pollution control cost coefficient is below a low threshold. Contrary to intuition, larger government subsidies do not necessarily lead to better promotion of low-carbon travel.
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Zhang, Y., Jiang, G., & Chen, A. (2025). Incentive Scheme for Low-Carbon Travel Based on the Public–Private Partnership. Mathematics, 13(15). https://doi.org/10.3390/math13152358
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