Electoral Linkages in Federal Systems: Barometer Voting and Economic Voting in the German Länder

Abstract

Federal systems create political competition at multiple territorial levels. While models of vertical bargaining conceptualise federal-subnational relations as occurring between parties with exogenously defined interests, federalism also structures forms of interdependence between the federal and subnational levels. Political competition in multi-level systems is marked by interdependence between the federal and subnational levels through barometer and second order voting effects. Findings of a more ‘autonomous’ form of political competition at the subnational level, through state-level economic voting, are less common. This article examines Germany, a highly interdependent federation, to assess the extent to which voting in Land elections responds to Land level economic performance and whether political and institutional factors affect this. I find evidence that in Land level elections, voting for the federally incumbent party is responsive to federal economic performance. Alongside this, there is evidence of ‘uncoupled’ electoral behaviour at the Land level, with Land level economic voting. This is enhanced by single party government.