Beyond revolutions: Mao-era China’s market entry strategies in Latin America

Abstract

How did the People’s Republic of China develop commercial relations with the Global South during its Maoist years? This paper aims to explore the question through China’s market entry strategies in Latin America. Latin America posed significant challenges for Mao-era China in establishing robust relations. Under intense US pressure and the dominance of conservative politics, most Latin American nations maintained minimal commercial and political ties with China until 1971 when Beijing replaced Taipei in the UN. Notable exceptions were Cuba, following its armed revolution in 1959, and Chile, after its peaceful revolution in 1970, which formally recognised the PRC, leading to substantial trade agreements. This paper examines Chinese trade promotion in the region during the 1960s and early 1970s, contending that commercial ties, particularly Chinese exports to Latin America, were not simply the inevitable outcome of these revolutions and the establishment of diplomatic relations. Policy makers in Beijing and Chinese commercial representatives in Latin America strategically navigated market entry by leveraging cultural promotions, focusing on competitive Chinese products, notably processed foods, and tapping into the Chinese Overseas community as intermediaries. These strategies not only cultivated a favourable image of China in the region but also acquainted Latin American consumers with Chinese brands and products. Moreover, the paper analyzes how Chinese trade promoters recognised and addressed the nuances and disparities among Latin American countries, comprehended the significance of Cuba and Chile within the region, and contextualised Latin America’s position in the global market.