Speak No Evil: Targeting a Population’s Neutrality to Defeat an Insurgency

Abstract

Operation Iraqi Freedom was predicated partially on a presumption of widespread popular support among the Iraqi people for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. The theory held that a relatively small military force could topple the Ba’athist regime with swift attacks aimed at key targets. Then, using momentum secured by liberating an oppressed people, a temporary government comprised of expatriate technocrats could step in to rule the country until a government could be elected. Shortly thereafter, the reasoning held, the country would achieve stability and the United States could dramatically reduce troop levels. This vision was largely deflated shortly after coalition troops dashed north, securing vast swaths of Iraq and quickly destroying remnant military forces. Despite stunning military success, the victory failed to simultaneously produce the anticipated wellspring of support. Within three months of the fall of Baghdad, this notion was completely discredited as Iraq found itself in the grip of a nationwide wave of violence.