The influence of equity incentive on overinvestment in enterprises: The moderating effect based on the heterogeneity of executive team

Abstract

This paper empirically examines the moderating effect of executive team heterogeneity on the influence of equity incentive on overinvestment behavior by using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2014 to 2018. The results show that equity incentive can restrain the overinvestment behavior of enterprises; The greater the age heterogeneity of the senior management team, the weaker the influence of equity incentive on overinvestment will be; The greater the gender heterogeneity of the senior management team, the greater the influence of equity incentive on the overinvestment of enterprises will be. The heterogeneity of executive team education and tenure has no effect on the relationship between equity incentive and overinvestment. The conclusion of this study has some enlightenment on how to construct and optimize the senior management team of listed companies, so that the senior management team can play its role fully and make reasonable and effective investment decisions.