Security For Development: Tun Abdul Razak’s National Security Strategy

Abstract

In the case of Malaysia, even though, First Emergency (1948-1960) was declared over in 1960, the communist illegal activities led by Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) were still continuously active. Their illegal activities were the major threats towards the fragile structure of multi-ethnic society in Malaysia. The objective of this paper is to identify the national security strategy crafted during Tun Abdul Razak’s premiership in 1970s that contribute to the success of countering communist insurgents. This period of low-intensity conflict between the Government of Malaysia and CPM also known as the Second Emergency (1969-1989) was a tough and challenging phase of Malaysia to ensure it survival as the sovereign state. For the purpose of this research, focus on case study of Northern State Peninsula of Malaysia to analyze the implementation and consequences of strategy. The paper discover Tun Abdul Razak’s national security strategy to counter communist insurgents does not solely rely on the usage of hard power but together with non-kinetic approaches through the internal development strategy led to victory on side of government to ended the illegal guerrilla activities of Communist insurgents and unite the population in Malaysia. The collapse of CPM in Malaysia, with the signed treaty of surrender for peace or known as Hatyai Peace Accord in year 1989 indicated the efficacious of national security strategy crafted by the Malaysian government.