The surprising power of hiding information in facility location

5Citations
Citations of this article
7Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

Abstract

Facility location is the problem of locating a public facility based on the preferences of multiple agents. In the classic framework, where each agent holds a single location on a line and can misreport it, strategyproof mechanisms for choosing the location of the facility are well-understood. We revisit this problem in a more general framework. We assume that each agent may hold several locations on the line with different degrees of importance to the agent. We study mechanisms which elicit the locations of the agents and different levels of information about their importance. Further, in addition to the classic manipulation of misreporting locations, we introduce and study a new manipulation, whereby agents may hide some of their locations. We argue for its novelty in facility location and applicability in practice. Our results provide a complete picture of the power of strategyproof mechanisms eliciting different levels of information and with respect to each type of manipulation. Surprisingly, we show that in some cases hiding locations can be a strictly more powerful manipulation than misreporting locations.

References Powered by Scopus

Algorithmic game theory

0
2340Citations
N/AReaders
Get full text

On strategy-proofness and single peakedness

583Citations
N/AReaders
Get full text

Kidney exchange

559Citations
N/AReaders
Get full text

Cited by Powered by Scopus

Mechanism Design for Facility Location with Fractional Preferences and Minimum Distance

2Citations
N/AReaders
Get full text

Facility location games with ordinal preferences

1Citations
N/AReaders
Get full text

Facility Location Games with Ordinal Preferences

1Citations
N/AReaders
Get full text

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Hossain, S., Micha, E., & Shah, N. (2020). The surprising power of hiding information in facility location. In AAAI 2020 - 34th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (pp. 2168–2175). AAAI press. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5592

Readers' Seniority

Tooltip

PhD / Post grad / Masters / Doc 3

75%

Professor / Associate Prof. 1

25%

Readers' Discipline

Tooltip

Computer Science 4

67%

Business, Management and Accounting 1

17%

Social Sciences 1

17%

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free