Military Loyalty in Britain’s Withdrawal from Aden, 1960–1967

Abstract

This article argues an understanding of the British withdrawal from Aden in 1967 requires greater attention to be paid to the loyalty of the local security forces who were supposed to help repress the insurgency in south Arabia, and then secure a friendly state when Britain left. The Federal Regular Army (FRA), the most important formation, proved to be consistently unreliable through behaviours ranging from the attempted murder of British personnel, to desertion and political activism. However, disbanding the FRA might have made matters even worse, so British officers sought to manipulate its loyalty through various mechanisms, including pay rises, ignoring disloyal incidents and directing propaganda at the soldiers. These endeavours succeeded in holding off a mutiny until June 1967, but only by creating a force which became infiltrated by the insurgent movements and lacked the capacity to play any meaningful role in defending the federation. This analysis suggests studies on British counter-insurgency should investigate further the role of local allies in strategy and operations.