Studying different pricing schemes using different game models in CRN: Market-equilibrium and non-cooperative model

Abstract

Cognitive Radio Network (CRN) is an intelligent wireless communication system that aims to achieve efficient spectrum utilization through monitoring spectrum status, continuously. Spectrum utilization can be accomplished by sharing of spectrum holes from primary users (PUs) or primary service providers (PSPs) to secondary users (SUs). In spectrum sharing process, (PSPs) or spectrum-sellers sell unused spectrum to secondary service providers (SSPs) or spectrum buyers according to specified price. In this paper, pricing issue will be investigated with two different market models, namely, market-equilibrium and Bertrand competitive market. In market-equilibrium, pricing depends on the balance between spectrum demand and spectrum supply. It is solved in a simplified manner that reduces computational process. In Bertrand competitive market, PSPs try to accomplish the highest payoff regarding others by manipulating in price. Genetic algorithm (GA) will be proposed with Bertrand competitive to reduce and optimize average pricing charged to SSP for more spectrum selling comparing with round-robin algorithm.