Abstract
There is a rich tradition within game theory, decision theory, economics, and philosophy correlating practical rationality with impartiality, and spatial and temporal neutrality. I argue that in some cases we should give priority to people over both times and places, and to times over places. I also show how three plausible dominance principles regarding people, places, and times conflict, so that we cannot accept all three. However, I argue that there are some cases where we should give priority to times over people, suggesting that there is impersonal value to the distribution of high quality life over different times.
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Temkin, L. S. (2015). Rationality with respect to people, places, and times. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 45(5–6), 576–608. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2015.1122386
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