Untangling the commons: three different forms of commonality

Abstract

The term “commons” is used with increasing frequency in the public debate and scientific literature in various fields (including economics and sociology). However, this term is often ambiguous and used to denote quite different things. Obviously, any concept, and therefore also the concept of “commons”, does not have an “essence”. Clear definitions do not serve to capture what something is in itself, but only to rigorously specify what use is made of a given expression. In other words, linguistic precision is not a value in itself, but becomes necessary when misunderstandings can arise – as happens in the case under discussion. This article critically revisits the notion itself of “commons”. It is based on an extensive interdisciplinary literature review. However, the intent is not to provide an overview of the state of the art but to suggest a critical reframing of the discourse. The overall aim is not solely to distinguish different uses of the term; it is also to clarify the real scope and meaning of each definition of it – such as the one proposed by Elinor Ostrom, which is too often inappropriately invoked. As the article demonstrates, Ostrom’s view on many issues perfectly aligns with the Hayekian account of the evolutionary, emerging nature of a significant number of successful institutions and forms of organization.