Understanding the Threats of Trojaned Quantized Neural Network in Model Supply Chains

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Abstract

Deep learning with edge computing arises as a popular paradigm for powering edge devices with intelligence. As the size of deep neural networks (DNN) continually increases, model quantization, which converts the full-precision model into lower-bit representation while mostly preserving the accuracy, becomes a prerequisite for deploying a well-trained DNN on resource-limited edge devices. However, to properly quantize a DNN requires an essential amount of expert knowledge, or otherwise the model accuracy would be devastatingly affected. Alternatively, recent years witness the birth of third-party model supply chains which provide pretrained quantized neural networks (QNN) for free downloading. In this paper, we systematically analyze the potential threats of trojaned models in third-party QNN supply chains. For the first time, we describe and implement a QUAntization-SpecIfic backdoor attack (QUASI), which manipulates the quantization mechanism to inject a backdoor specific to the quantized model. In other words, the attacker-specified inputs, or triggers, would not cause misbehaviors of the trojaned model in full precision until the backdoor function is automatically completed by a normal quantization operation, producing a trojaned QNN which can be triggered with a near 100% success rate. Our proposed QUASI attack reveals several key vulnerabilities in the existing QNN supply chains: (i) QUASI demonstrates a third-party QNN released online can also be injected with backdoors, while, unlike full-precision models, there is almost no working algorithm for checking the fidelity of a QNN. (ii) More threateningly, the backdoor injected by QUASI remains inactivated in the full-precision model, which inhibits model consumers from attributing undergoing trojan attacks to the malicious model provider. As a practical implication, we alarm it can be highly risky to accept and deploy third-party QNN on edge devices at the current stage, if without future mitigation studies.

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Pan, X., Zhang, M., Yan, Y., & Yang, M. (2021). Understanding the Threats of Trojaned Quantized Neural Network in Model Supply Chains. In ACM International Conference Proceeding Series (pp. 634–645). Association for Computing Machinery. https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485881

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