Game-Theoretic Models for Usage-based Maintenance Contract

Abstract

A usage-based maintenance contracts with coordination and non coordination between two parties is studied in this paper. The contract is applied to a dump truck operated in a mining industry. The situation under study is that an agent offers service contract to the owner of the truck after warranty ends. This contract has only a time limit but no usage limit. If the total usage per period exceeds the maximum usage allowed in the contract, then the owner will be charged an additional cost. In general, the agent (Original Equipment Manufacturer/OEM) provides a full coverage of maintenance, which includes PM and CM under the lease contract. The decision problem for the owner is to select the best option offered that fits to its requirement, and the decision problem for the agent is to find the optimal maintenance efforts for a given price of the service option offered. We first find the optimal decisions using coordination scheme and then with non coordination scheme for both parties.