Hiding behind the curtain: performance information and public officials’ policy instrument preferences in visible and invisible domains

Abstract

This paper examines how performance information affects public officials’ preferences for policy instruments in visible public goods (e.g., above-ground roads and parks) and invisible public goods (e.g., below-ground sewage systems) domains. Using a survey experiment with 1171 Chinese public officials, we find that in the visible domain, regardless of performance information, public officials prefer market-oriented indirect policy instruments (e.g., outsourcing) over government-oriented direct policy instruments (e.g., direct government provision), suggesting that avoiding blame is key motivations for understanding their policy preferences. In contrast, performance information plays a limited role in the invisible domain, with public officials prioritizing effectiveness and legitimacy in their choice of instruments. These findings suggest that performance management systems alone may not be sufficient to incentivize proactive governance. Thus, there is a need for balanced accountability mechanisms that encourage the implementation of appropriate instruments in different policy areas to achieve policy goals.