Campaign Treasurers and Disclosure: Requiem for a Third-Party Gatekeeper Strategy?

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Abstract

This article provides the first empirical study of the work of campaign treasurers, an important part of the original design for the regulation of campaign finance. Third-party enforcers and gatekeepers are central figures in many regulatory systems, but campaign treasurers are rarely seen as important tools in the oversight of American elections. Drawing on interviews with treasurers, election law lawyers, and Federal Election Commission (FEC) staff, our analysis emphasizes the dynamics of campaigns, particularly the cyclical and transitory nature of candidate campaigns and the weak regulation by the FEC. The result has been very hands-off oversight by treasurers. This article suggests a number of steps, such as professionalization and licensure, by which treasurers could become more accountable and significant gatekeepers. Unfortunately, the possibilities of reform are also increasingly undermined by pathways and practices of financing campaigns that circumvent treasurers and candidate campaigns entirely.

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APA

Kindree, T., & Schmidt, P. (2019). Campaign Treasurers and Disclosure: Requiem for a Third-Party Gatekeeper Strategy? Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, 18(2), 145–159. https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2018.0502

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