Restrictive rules of speechmaking as a tool to maintain party unity: The case of oppressed political conflict in German parliament debates on the euro crisis

Abstract

In parliaments with party-centred rules of speechmaking, like the German Bundestag, we observe an overrepresentation of loyal frontbenchers on the speakers’ list. Previous research shows that party-controlled access to the plenary floor limits opportunities to voice dissent, but we lack empirical investigation of the overall impact on the contestation in debates. This article presents a case study of Bundestag debates on the euro crisis, which estimates the discursive impact by comparing speeches with MPs’ written expressions, known as explanations of vote (EoVs), and introducing association rule mining in an innovative network analytical approach. The findings confirm that restrictive rules reduce the visibility of intra-party conflict and constrain the space for coherent narratives, backbench concerns and political alternatives at an aggregate level, raising questions about the democratic functions of parliamentary debates. In this case, MPs use EoVs as an alternative channel to promote transnational solidarity in a European crisis.