Norms of Democracy, Staged Democrats, and Supply of Exclusionary Ideology

Abstract

Existing literature sees attitudinal support for liberal democratic values as a crucial way to prevent the success of illiberal actors and their policies. But recent studies show that democratic support can coexist with lack of punishment for backsliding practices. To reconcile these findings, I argue that social norms generate incentives to declare that one opposes illiberal actors even if one does not—what I call staged democrats. Staged democrats are not a stable safeguard against illiberal politicians, because information shocks can reveal that they do not sincerely oppose illiberalism. Studying Switzerland, where referendums provide information on the sincere preferences of citizens, I collect data on referendum results, public opinion surveys, and party positions. My analyses show that if referendums reveal that the positions of far-right parties are more popular than expected, those parties become more exclusionary. Attitudes only prevent illiberal policy if they are sincerely held.