The fair and the furious: interpersonal effects of moral anger in economic bargaining

Abstract

Resource allocation involves a complex process in which cognitive and emotional processes are intertwined. Specifically, in interpersonal contexts emotions such as anger, along with analytical thinking strategies, significantly influence decisions in resource allocation. However, it remains untested whether the moral context of the cause of anger affects resource allocation and how tendencies toward cognitive thinking styles may interact with the anger responses of game partners. This study examines how interacting with an angry (or not angry) partner, motivated by moral or non-moral daily-life issues, influences economic bargaining behavior in the Dictator Game (DG) and the Ultimatum Game (UG). The study also considers how differences in analytical thinking tendencies may influence these interactions. Participants engaged with partners who displayed high or low levels of anger reasoned by either moral (anger because of an unfair treatment), non-moral contexts (anger because of losing a match of the football team they support) or no specified reason (control condition). Results showed that participants allocated more resources in the UG than the DG, especially when their partners exhibited higher levels of moral anger, compared to the control condition (high non-moral anger). However, variations in analytical thinking did not significantly impact decision-making in either game. These findings suggest that moral anger may promote prosocial behavior, especially in negotiation contexts, regardless of cognitive predispositions.