Der Vertrag von Lissabon – eine tragfähige und abschließende Antwort auf konstitutionelle Grundfragen?

Abstract

The Treaty of Lisbon presents itself as the answer to three key constitutional questions: How should the division of competencies between the Union and the member states best be defined? How can actors be positioned and procedures be structured to increase the Union's capacity to act? What provisions will make the EU system ‚more democratic‘ and thereby increase its legitimacy? In answering these questions the member states are faced with a number of structural dilemmas. A series of changes to the existing provisions is expected to lead to increased efficiency as well as more democratic participation and controls within individual institutions and procedures. It is uncertain, however, if these effects will prove mutually reinforcing or if, on the contrary, they will turn out to be counterproductive in combination. The underlying constitutional problems and questions are not conclusively addressed by the Lisbon Treaty.